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The paper provides empirical evidence about the effects of the ￿pay-as-you-go￿ and the 
individual account social security systems over family choice variables such as fertility rate, 
schooling, and time spent on children and it links those effects with the sustainability of the fiscal 
budget on the ￿pay-as-you-go￿ system. The paper uses the 1998 CASEN database from Chile. On 
the database, the ￿pay-as-you-go￿ and the individual account systems coexist for individuals 35 
years and older as result of the regulations established by the 1981 social security reform law. 
The results show that the numbers of children per family and female labor supply are depressed 
by increases on the ￿pay-as-you-go￿ payroll tax rate. Those effects produce an endogenous 
sustainability problem over the fiscal budget, as the number of individuals paying taxes and the 
amount of taxes paid by females decrease endogenously over time. The individual account system 
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1.Introduction 
Social security programs are becoming the object of increasing interest between 
governments and economists. Governments that manage non-funded social security programs 
face a fiscal problem caused by the change on the age pyramid over time. On the other hand, 
economists had produced a large research on this topic. However the literature mainly focuses on 
the impacts on savings or economic growth of the social security system and usually the impacts 
on the family decision￿s variables, as fertility or labor supply, are neglected. Those two variables 
will be the main concern of this paper as they may allow the family to react to the establishment 
of a non-funded social security system. Negative effects of social security tax over fertility and 
labor supply produce a sustainability problem over the fiscal budget as the number of individuals 
paying social security taxes and the amount paid by them decrease over time. 
Barro (1974) indicated that social security system should not affect family decision as 
long as people cannot avoid the social security tax. However, the family could take actions to 
avoid the tax when the tax is a not a lump sum contribution. In fact, when the tax is a labor tax the 
family may choose to reduce their labor supply and switch their time endowment to other time 
intensive activities like bearing children. In this case, impacts over the number of children and the 
time spent on them may occur. 
Auerbach and Kotlikoff (1985) already addressed a similar problem in a general 
equilibrium model with a ￿pay-as-you-go￿ (PAYG) social security system where they show that 
facing an exogenous baby bust, the payroll tax rate should triplicate in a 70 years period. This 
case may be significantly aggravated if there exists a negative association between the payroll tax 
rate and the fertility rate, as this paper will emphasize. Those effects may be important for fiscal 
policy as they contribute to accelerate the change on the age pyramid. Hence, the negative impact 
on the family￿s fertility decision may aggravate the fiscal problem and accelerate the elimination 
of the ￿pay-as-you-go￿ social security system. In this scenario, the ￿pay-as-you-go￿ system has 
an endogenous problem of sustainability.   3 
The paper will provide empirical evidence of the effect of the ￿pay-as-you-go￿ system 
over the family choice variables using a micro dataset from Chile. Later, evidence of the effect of 
the individual account system, if any, is also provided. This last case is also analyzed as countries 
facing problem of sustainability on their social security system usually switch to the individual 
account system. Hence, some effects of this transition over fertility rates and schooling may be 
provided. However, the main purpose of the paper aims to determine the existence of the 
endogenous relationship between the PAYG social security system and the age distribution.  
The case of Chile seems interesting because Chile had a PAYG social security system 
since 1925 until 1981 when it introduced an individual account social security system. However, 
as it will be explained later, the law that introduced the change of system on 1981, allowed to 
some set of individuals to remain affiliated to the old PAYG system. Hence, currently there are 
individuals affiliated to the new individual account system and to the old PAYG system due to 
the characteristics of the 1981 reform law. 
The argument developed in the paper basically indicates that there could exist an adverse 
effect of larger social security tax rates over fertility rates on the PAYG system that accelerates 
the change on the age pyramid and affects the sustainability of the program. In that case, the 
economics of the family literature would indicate that schooling might be positively affected due 
to the trade-off between quantity and quality of children (see Becker and Barro, 1988). Some 
initial evidence on those facts can be obtained when we analyze the evolution of aggregate 
fertility rates and aggregate schooling on Chile. Graph 1 shows the evolution of fertility rate and 
enrollment rates on secondary education throughout the twentieth century in Chile. During this 
period fertility rates were stable until 1930. Starting on 1930, fertility rates showed an initial drop 
accompanied by a sustained decrease over time. Also in 1978 it seems to exist another change on 
the behavior of the fertility rates, as it seems to stabilize. The two changes coincide with first the 
introduction of the PAYG social security and later the replacement of the PAYG system with the 
individual account system. Further, a similar but inverted behavior is followed by the enrollment   4 
rate on secondary education, as it would be indicated by the existence of a trade-off between 
quantity and quality of children. Even when those changes coincide with the changes on social 
security system and hence they suggest some interaction between social security system and 
fertility or schooling, it must be notice that they also coincide with the largest crisis faced by the 
Chilean economy on 1930 and 1982 respectively
2 and thus, they may be not directly related to the 
social security system. 
[Insert Graph 1] 
  The paper aims to identify the effects of the social security system over the family 
decision variables and it links those results with the sustainability of the PAYG system. The 
discussion and the results of the paper will be presented as follows. Section 2 presents a brief 
review of the literature on the topic. Section 3 analyzes the Chilean historic background on social 
security system while section 4 presents the dataset. The dataset contains data of individuals 
affiliated to new individual account pension system; individuals affiliated to the old pension 
system (the PAYG system) and individuals not affiliated at all to any pension system. In fact, 
individuals currently working on 1981 were allowed by the new law to choose between remaining 
on the ￿pay-as-you-go￿ system and switching to the new individual account system. Also self-
employed individuals and individuals out of the labor force are allowed to remain not affiliated if 
they wish. This characteristic of the dataset will allow us to test the effect of the PAYG and the 
individual account system over the family decision variables on the PAYG and the individual 
account systems using the Chilean case as an experiment. Section 5 presents the empirical 
strategy followed on the paper. Two different estimation methods are proposed to deal with the 
self-selection problem faced by individuals allowed to choose between social security systems. 
The results are later reported on section 6. Also in this section, the evolution of the PAYG social 
security tax rate over time is simulated under the restrictions that the system has zero debt and 
fertility rate is affected by the tax rate. Finally section 7 concludes. 
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2. The link between social security and family choice variables 
2.1 The Theory 
Becker and Barro (1988) present a dynastic family setup where fertility rate is one of the 
choice variables. They link fertility rates and social security system by indicating that an increase 
on the PAYG social security tax rate faced by each child has a negative effect on the present 
value of child￿s income. Altruistic parents anticipate this effect and leave larger bequests. But 
larger bequests increase each child￿s marginal cost and discourage parents from having children. 
Erlich and Zhong (1998) propose a moral hazard problem instead. They argue that 
children provide income to their parents when they are retired. Hence the costs of raising children 
are justified by the later benefits obtained. However when a PAYG social security system is 
instituted parents will obtain income from the government program when retired. As the benefits 
of having children are reduced, parents face less incentive to raise children. 
Mulligan (1997) proposes instead, a positive effect of the PAYG system over fertility 
rates. He focuses on the time cost of children. In fact time has two alternative activities, bearing 
children and labor supply. In that case, when the social security tax rate is a payroll tax, the 
incentives to supply labor are smaller and more children are raised.  
Cerda (2001) shows even when children are time intensive and labor is taxed, larger tax 
rates can be related to lower fertility rates. In fact, larger taxes provide more incentive to 
childbearing and time spent per child may increase. But as larger time will be spent per child, the 
marginal cost per children increases. It follows that the optimal number of children decreases. 
This case focuses on the quality quantity trade-off on children. Even when more total time is 
allocated to childbearing ￿as in Mulligan￿s case-, fertility may be decreased since per capita time 
spent on each child is largely increased. 
The rate of return of the social security system may also be a determinant of fertility 
rates. On the Becker and Barro setup, larger current benefits faced by parent are associated with 
larger future taxes. As we increase the burden on children -they will pay larger taxes-, altruistic   6 
parents leave larger bequests, increasing the marginal cost of each child and decreasing the 
number of children. On the same way, the moral hazard problem of Erlich and Zhong also argues 
for a lower number of children, as the rate of return on the PAYG system increases. The larger is 
this rate of return, the less transfers parents will be required from children when retired.  
As indicated above, the effect over the number of children is usually linked with the 
effect over schooling. The links comes from the literature on the family that argues for a trade-off 
between quantity and quality of children. In fact the shadow price of an additional children 
depends positively on the human capital investment while the shadow price of an additional unit 
of human capital investment depends on the number of children, as we spent the same amount on 
each of them. Hence it follows that exogenous increases on fertility affect negatively schooling 
and also the effects of the initial changes on taxes over fertility rate are stretched out as the level 
of schooling is affected through the effect on the price of children. 
The literature does not discuss the effect of the individual account system over the family 
choice variables. However, it is easy to extend the Barro and Becker setup to conclude that as the 
individual account system does not produce income effects and it just switches the path of income 
over time - as individuals￿ contribution are invested on the capital market and they obtain the 
capital market rental rate. Hence, no effects over fertility or schooling should observe. This 
conclusion may vary if borrowing constraints are included. 
In summary, the literature predicts mainly negative effects over fertility rates and labor 
supply while positive effects over schooling when the social security tax rate increases on the 
PAYG system. An increase on the rate of return of the social security system should have 
opposite effects on the PAYG system. In general, in the case of the individual account system no 
effects should be observed as taxes raises. 
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2.2 The empirical evidence 
  The empirical evidence on the literature is not large and it mainly focuses on fertility 
rates using macro data. Song (2000) uses a sample of 95 countries over a period of 33 years (1960 
to 1992). She separates the sample among three different sets of countries. The first set of 
countries did not change the PAYG social security system over the period, the second set of 
countries did not have social security system at the beginning of the sample and introduced a 
￿pay-as-you-go￿ system and finally the last set of countries switched from a ￿pay-as-you-go￿ 
system to an individual account system. On the first set of countries, Song found that an increase 
on the size of the PAYG system from 10% to 15% produces a decrease of 0.3% on birth rates. On 
the second set of countries, a country that initially did not have social security and implemented a 
PAYG system has an 8% drop on birth rate. Finally, the last sample shows that a country 
switching to the private system from the PAYG system would increase its fertility rate by 29%.  
The second study is the one of Erlich and Zhong (1998). They analyzed only PAYG 
pension system and separated the sample between rich and poor countries. They indicated that if 
the pension size were similar to its 1960 level as a fraction of GDP, the growth rate of rich 
countries would increase from 2.74% to 2.82%. They interpret this last evidence as effects over 
human capital accumulation. They also indicate that in poor countries the fertility rate is 
negatively affected on 0.22% on average.  
Compared with the two papers above discussed, this paper uses a micro dataset that 
allows us to control by the different type of system and it focuses on fertility, schooling and labor 
supply decision at the household level.  
 
3. The Chilean historic background 
Chile has currently an individual account social security system but it just switched to 
this system on 1981
3. The new system becomes obligatory to the individuals entering the labor 
force after the law changed. However, individuals currently working on 1981 were not required to   8 
switch to the new system and they may choose if switching or remaining on the old PAYG 
system.  Also, there was a set of individuals that is not required to affiliate to any social security 
system at all. Basically, self-employed individuals and individuals out of the labor force who 
have not worked before compose this group. Hence, those individuals may choose if affiliate or 
not to the social security system. 
The factors that may affect the decision choice of the later group of individual -not 
affiliated to any social security system at all- will be now stated. The first set of factor is the 
employment status. The law allowed to self-employed individuals to remain unaffiliated if they 
wish. Hence, being an employee place immediate restrictions over this decision. It is expected 
that self-employed individuals affiliate less than any other worker, as they do not need to surpass 
the law to remain unaffiliated as other type of workers, such as employees. 
 A second set of factor to remain not affiliated deals with the decision of entering the 
labor force - individuals out of the labor force are not required to affiliate. In general, females 
have less incentive to enter the labor force as usually their husbands work. Also richer individuals 
may have a higher reservation wage and hence they are less likely to enter the labor force. In the 
same way, individuals with higher schooling face a larger wage rate and have larger incentives to 
enter to the labor force.  
The second group not affiliated to the new system is the group of individuals affiliated to 
the PAYG system. They may be affiliated to four main institutions: the social security 
administration (SSA), the private worker pension administration (PWPA), the public worker 
pension administration (PUWPA) and the army forces pension administration (AAFFPA
4). Some 
others institutions existed, but their size was smaller than those cited above. The social security 
administration manages the pension funds of unskilled workers of the non public sector. 
Individuals that remained affiliated to the social security administration currently pays 19.1% of 
their labor income as social security tax. The private worker pension administration includes 
skilled workers of the non public sector and taxes their affiliates at a 20.15%. The public sector   9 
administration includes the majority of public sector workers and taxes their affiliates at 19.03%. 
Finally the army forces pension administration includes as contributors all individuals working on 
the army force. They are taxed at 20%. Those taxes are quite large when compared to the tax rate 
paid by the affiliated to the new pension system. In fact a worker affiliated to the individual 
account system pays only a 10% of her labor income as social security tax. This tax differential 
and the subsequent increase on the disposable income for those individuals switching to the new 
system may have been very influential on the overall switching. This is one of the facts that may 
explain that almost 75% of the affiliated to the PAYG at the beginning of 1981 switched to the 
new system
5 during the first year of implementation of the individual account system. 
However, a large number of individuals stayed on the PAYG system. There are larger 
incentives to stay on the old system for some identifiable groups. On the PAYG system the 
pension are determined as fraction of the total wage income obtained during the last working 
years before retirement ￿usually the last 5 years -. Also there are debits to this wage income if the 
worker is a widow, a woman or a hard laborer. In fact if the worker is widow, she obtains an 
increase of 2 years of wage income if she is affiliated to the social security administration or the 
private worker pension administration. Maternity has a similar impact, as an increase on 1 years 
of wage income is added to the calculation base per child if she stays on the SSA or PRWPA. 
Finally, hard laborers have 10 years of debits in their accounts if they were affiliated to the SSA 
and they work at the mining sector and 5 years of debits if they were affiliated to the SSA and 
they did not work on the mining sector. Also workers on night shifts got 5 years of subsidy if they 
were affiliated to the PRWPA. Those sets of workers lost their subsidy if they switch to the new 
pension system
6. 
Some others incentive to stay on the old system are linked to the level of compensation 
obtained from the institution they were affiliated. In fact, when we compare the level of pension 
on the 4 main institutions on the PAYG system we find that on 1980, the average pension 
receiver of the social security administration obtained a 46% of the average Chilean pension,   10 
while individuals affiliated to the private worker pension administration obtained 77% of the 
average and individuals affiliated to the public worker pension administration received 148% of 
the average. In the case of the army forces pension administration, the benefit was 350% of the 
average Chilean pension. Notice that there could exist some self-selection in those data in the 
sense that workers affiliated to the social security administration are unskilled workers while the 
one affiliated to the private worker pension administration are skilled and hence the difference on 
pension may be explained, at least in part, by differences on past contributions. However there is 
also some exogeneity on those benefits. Public workers are not quite different to private workers 
and also army forces do not have larger wage incomes than the rest of the economy in general. 
This exogenous component of the difference on the level of pension may have had an impact on 
the decision of switching to the new pension system. 
Finally, the age of the individual on 1981 may also have an effect on the decision of 
switching to the new system. Pensions, as explained above, were mainly determined by wage 
income during the last 5 years of work. Hence workers have a strong incentive to obtain higher 
wages during the last part of their working life only. In the new system, as the individual has a 
private account that gain interest over time, they have incentive to work and accumulate pension 
funds over all the working life. In that scenario older individuals that did not work hard enough 
during their working life before 1981, did not have incentives to switch as the pension they would 
receive on their retirement age would be lower than the one they would obtain on the PAYG 
system. On the other hand a fairly young individual at the moment the law was passed was not 
negatively influenced by the law change as she did not have already play her working life 
strategy. In fact, only 8% of affiliated workers aged 63 at the moment of the reform switch to the 
new system while almost 100% of the affiliated workers aged 28 or younger switch to the new 
system. Graph 2 shows the fraction of affiliated that switch to the new system when the law was 
implemented as a function of their age. As age increase the decline of the fraction increases as 
individuals are nearer to retirement and they can obtain the benefits of the old system.   11 
[Insert Graph 2] 
It should be notice that there are three sets of individuals that did not have the choice 
between systems. First, individuals 18 years old and younger when the law passed are obliged to 
affiliate to the new system as soon as they enter the labor force. Second, individuals already 
retired on 1981 stayed on the PAYG system as they were already receiving benefits from this 
system and finally, individuals affiliated to the army force were required to stay on the PAYG 
system by the 1981 law. 
In summary, Chile has currently individuals affiliated to the old PAYG system, but also 
individuals affiliated to the new individual account system and individuals not affiliated at any 
system at all. Among those set of individuals self-selection arises for individuals that were 
currently working at 1981. Also there are some sets of individuals that could not choose between 
the systems due to exogenous restrictions imposed by law. 
 
4. The data 
This paper uses the 1998 CASEN
7 survey realized by the Chilean government during 
November and December of 1998. The survey is based on a random sample of 48107 households
8 
with a probabilistic error of 0.45%. There are 188360 individuals on the sample. The survey has 
information on schooling, health, housing, income, employment and demographic characteristics.  
The data on employment provides information about the social security system the 
individual is affiliated
9. The survey shows that among the individuals aged 35 and older on 1998 
￿ individuals 18 years and older on 1981- 41% is not affiliated at all to any social security system, 
while 22% is affiliated to the ￿pay-as-you-go￿ system and 37% to the new system. 
The observation of some statistics obtained from the dataset shows some interesting 
patterns. In fact, it shows that the average number of children per head of households aged 35 and 
older and affiliated to the PAYG system is 1.21 while the average number for the group not 
affiliated to the PAYG system is 1.94. In the same way, the average number of years of schooling   12 
for children of head of households aged 35 and older and affiliated to the PAYG system is 10.28 
years while similar group where the head is not affiliated to the PAYG system has an average of 
9.4 years of schooling per child. Finally, when we analyze the hours worked by females, we 
observe that females affiliated to the PAYG system work 43.3 hours on average while females 
affiliated to the individual account system work 44.2 hours on average. Hence in general, the 
observations seem to be in line with the theory as family substitute away from children but spent 
more time on each of them on the PAYG system. Even when the observations are in line with 
theory, they may be influenced by self-selection bias and some further analysis is required. 
The description of the data is next. The two main variables of interest are the tax rate paid 
under the social security system and the rate of return of the social security system. The first 
variable is constructed using question 21 of the CASEN employment section. The question is: 
Are you affiliated to any pension system? The possible answers are: (1) Social Security 
Administration, (2) Public Worker Pension Administration, (3) Private Worker Pension 
Administration, (4) Private system (AFP
10), (5) Army Forces Pension System, (6) Other, (7) Not 
affiliated. The tax rates are known by law -the values were indicated above- for groups (1) to (5), 
while the group (7) does not pay taxes. The groups of individuals that respond to be affiliated to 
other social security institution - category (6) - are individuals that are affiliated to a PAYG 
institution different than (1), (2), (3) and (5). The average level of tax rate on those institutions 
was imputed to category (6).  
To construct the rate of return of the PAYG social security system it was estimated first, 
the present value of total contributions to the system and later the present value of total benefits 
obtained from the social security system. The contributions to the system were estimated using a 
Mincer equation for individuals affiliated to the PAYG system and currently working. Using this 
estimation, the lifecycle wage profile for individuals affiliated to the PAYG was constructed by 
varying age from 20 years to 65 years old on the case of males and 20 years to 60 years old on the 
case of females
11. This procedure allows us to calculate the year contribution to the social security   13 
system by using the tax rate. Using a 5% discount rate, the present value of tax contributions is 
computed. The procedure to construct the expected benefit from the PAYG system is analogous. 
Using the retirement income data, we estimated retirement income on the PAYG system as a 
function of schooling, and demographic characteristics as dummy variables for widow or married 
individuals plus age profiles. The lifecycle of retirement benefits were estimated from 60 to 80 
years old for females and from 65 to 80 years old for males. The death date was set equal to 80 
years, as life expectancy in Chile is approximately 80 years old on 1998. Using the 5% discount 
rate the present value of benefits was estimated and the rate of return of the PAYG social security 
system was constructed as the ratio of the difference between the present value of benefits and the 
present value of taxes over the present value of benefits.  
On the case of individual not affiliated to the PAYG social security system, the 
calculations are as follows. The present value of the benefits received by the individuals affiliated 
to the individual account social security system is set equal to the present value of taxes, as the 
private system invests the individual contributions on the capital market. Hence the rate of return 
of the social security system is set equal to zero, by definition of the individual account system. 
Finally on the case of individuals not affiliated to any social security system, the present value of 
taxes and benefits was set equal to zero. 
 
5. The empirical strategy 
The empirical strategy followed in the paper will be to estimate a switching regression 
model. In fact, individuals ￿at least a set of them- may choose among three different status, 
affiliation to an individual account social security system, affiliation to a PAYG social security 
system and not affiliation at all. The individuals choose sequentially, first between affiliation and 
not affiliation to a social security system and second between the two different systems if they 
chose to affiliate. The general specification of the econometric model will be the following: 
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Where 1(•) is an indicator function equal to one if the enclosed statement is true and zero 
otherwise while Z1 and Z2 are variables determining the affiliation to a social security system and 
the affiliation to the PAYG social security system on the set of individuals that already chosen to 
be affiliated to a social security system. The error terms ε1 and ε2 are uncorrelated unobservable 
that affect the decision process. They are normally distributed. The variable y will be the natural 
log of the number of children on a family, the natural log of the average schooling of the children 
or the natural log of hours worked while ￿tax￿ is the tax rate faced by individuals and ￿rben￿ is 
the rate of return from the PAYG social security system calculated above. The matrix X is a set of 
others variables that may influence the decisions and u is a well-behaved error term with zero 
mean. The superscript NF, PS and PG denote no affiliation, private system and PAYG 
respectively. 
Equation (3) corresponds to the behavior of individuals not affiliated to any social 
security system and obviously it does not include tax rate or rate of return of the system. Equation 
(4) corresponds to the behavior of individuals affiliated to the private system. The rate of return is 
not included as by definition this system has a present value of benefits equal to the present value 
of contributions. Finally, equation (5) presents the behavior of individuals affiliated to the PAYG 
system.   15 
Two different estimation methods will be performed using the dataset available to check 
the quality of the estimates and to provide results for the case of the PAYG system and the 
individual account system over the family choice variables. It must be noticed that the main 
econometric problem faced is the one of self-selection. In fact, if individual decisions among 
social security choices are influenced by unobservable characteristics, a direct estimation of any 
of those three states equation could be biased. Hence, the procedures here proposed, correct the 
bias that could exist. The first procedure follows the self-selection methodology elaborated by 
Heckman (1974) and Lee (1978). We will estimate a three steps procedure to obtain the effects of 
the tax rate and the rate of benefits over the family choice variables on the PAYG case. The 
second procedure will use an instrumental variable approach to correct by self-selection; 
estimates for the individual account system and the PAYG system are obtained on this case. 
 
5.1 Using control functions to correct by self-selection 
Here, we discuss the first empirical strategy. The procedure will generate estimates of the 
effect of the PAYG social security system over the family choice variables. 
The self-selection problem will be estimated by using a variant of the technique 
developed by Heckman (1974) and Lee (1978)
12. Those papers applied to the labor market. In the 
case of Heckman (1974), it was estimated a labor supply function with self-selection between 
entering the labor force or remaining outside of it, while in the case of Lee (1978), the effects of 
unionism over wage rates were investigated where the worker chooses to enter the union or not. 
However, those two papers have as characteristic just one self-selection criteria. In our case, there 
are multiple self-selection criteria, namely (1) affiliation or not affiliation to any social security 
system (PAYG or individual account) and (2) given the individual chose to affiliate, choosing 
between the PAYG and the individual account system. 
Basically to estimate the effect of the PAYG system over family decision choices, we 
need to estimate the following equation:   16 
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Hence, the direct estimation of equation (6) has bias due to the fact that E(u|I1
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*>0)≠0. 
The procedure developed by Heckman (1974) and Lee (1978) solves this problem when there is 
only one selectivity criteria by using a control function. In our case, there are two selectivity 
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Where φ and Φ are the probability density function of the normal distribution and the 
cumulative distribution of the normal distribution respectively and  ) , cov( i i u ε λ =
13.  
The procedure will be a three-step procedure. On the first step, using all the sample of 
individuals 35 years and older, equation (1) is estimated using a probit method. We focus on 
individuals 35 years and older as they were 18 years and older on 1981, when the new social 
security law was approved. This set of individuals is the one that can self-select and hence for 





where the ^ indicates fitted value. On the second step, and using only the individuals 35 years and 





2). On the last step equation (6) is estimated using only the individuals 35 years 
and older affiliated to the PAYG system. The control functions constructed above are used on the 
last step. The result will be discussed below. 
This procedure could be extended to the set of individuals affiliated to the individual 
account system however there is a caveat. When the third step on individuals affiliated to the   17 
private system is run, the tax rate does not present any variation on the individual account system 
and hence the effect of the tax rate cannot be estimated. Instead it will be used an instrumental 
variable approach as it will be explained below. 
 
5.2 The instrumental variable approach 
In this case the whole set of observations for head of households will be used to obtain 
variation on tax rate. The specification indicated by the equations (1)-(5) can be combined in the 
following way: 
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  Where y are the observed family decision variables while (I1
*tax) is a variable that 
includes the tax rate paid by all individuals affiliated to any social security system and zero 
otherwise. Also (I1
* I 2
*tax) is a second indicator function that includes the tax rate if the 
individual is affiliated to the PAYG system and zero otherwise, while the variable (I1
* I2
*rben) is 
a third indicator function that includes the return obtained from the social security system for 
individuals affiliated to the PAYG system and zero otherwise. As usual to obtain consistent 
estimates we require that the covariance between the right hand side variables and the error term 





*rben,u)=0. However, those 
conditions may possibly not hold, as the individuals may be self-selecting based on unobservable 
variables as indicated above.  
To avoid the problem of inconsistency we are going to use four different variables as 
exogenous instruments. The first variable will be a dummy variable that is equal to one if the 
individual is not a self-employed worker and zero otherwise. As indicated on section 3, self-
employed individuals were allowed exogenously to remain not affiliated by property of the 1981   18 
law while individuals with employment status other than self-employment must be affiliated to a 
system. Hence, this last dummy variable contains all the individuals that cannot choose to remain 
not affiliated to any social security system. A second instrument will be the set of individuals 
affiliated to the army forces. The instrument will be a dummy variable equal to one if the 
individual works on the army forces and zero otherwise. In fact, this set of individuals was 
required to stay affiliated to the PAYG system by the 1981 law. The third instrument will be 
determined by the set of individuals aged 18 years or younger on 1981. Those individuals are 
exogenously required by law to affiliate to the individual account system when they enter the 
labor force. Hence a dummy variable equal to one if the individual was 18 years or younger on 
1981 and zero otherwise is defined. Finally, a fourth instrument will be the set of individuals aged 
65 years and older when the law passed. Those individuals were retired on 1981 and they were 
already receiving pensions benefits on the old PAYG system. 






*rben) as we require. Also since the 1981 law determined exogenously the four sets of 
individuals, they must be uncorrelated with the error term of equation (8), as those individuals 
cannot react to the social security system as a response to unobservable variables. In fact some 
evidence on this last claim can be obtained. Let z be the set of instruments, the claim as usual 
requires that cov(u,z)=0. A stronger condition that will in general satisfy this last requirement is 
that cov(z,y)=0; namely that the covariance between the instruments and the independent 
variables as number of children, average schooling and hours supplied to the labor market is zero. 
Table 2 tests for mean equality for different group of individuals among demographic variables, 
location variables, income variables (including subsidies) and hours supplied to the labor market. 
The first two columns present the mean of the variables if the individuals are affiliated to the 
private system or to the PAYG system. The third column tests mean equality between the first 
two columns. The test is always strongly rejected. The same procedure is followed for columns 4 
to 6, where column 4 represents the set of individuals not self-employed and column 5 represents   19 
the set of self-employed individuals. Column 7 to 9 corresponds to the army force case, while 
column 10 to 12 and column 13 to 15 corresponds to individuals with threshold of 18 and 65 
years old when the law was passed. The results indicate that when the same tests are considered 
for our set of instrumental variables, even when the null hypothesis may be rejected, the 
differences between individuals belonging or not belonging to our instrumental sets are 
considerably smaller than the one observed between individuals on the private system versus 
individuals on the PAYG system.  
Moreover when consider the number of children we observe that the differences between 
PAYG and individual account system are quite large and significantly different. When controlling 
by our instrument, even when the test reject mean equality, the differences are considerably 
smaller and the T-test are also much smaller than the one comparing the first two columns. This 
evidence indicates that even when the covariance between the independent variable -number of 
children- and the instruments may be not zero, the instruments allows us to avoid the larger 
correlations of using the affiliation to PAYG system directly. The case of hours supplied to the 
labor market shows a much stronger condition. In fact, when controlling by our instruments there 
are no statistical differences between the means, while the test comparing the individual account 
and the PAYG system shows clear differences on means. Hence, this case argues that cov(y,z)=0, 
where z is the set of instruments. 
Also when we control for variables such as location, income, or subsidies, we obtain 
statistically equal means when the instrumental variables are used. Hence labor income shocks or 
subsidies shocks are uncorrelated with our instrumental variables. Those shocks may be an 
indicator of unobservable variables that allows us to infer that the condition cov(u,z)=0 holds. 
Thus, we can be confident about the fact that the instrumental variables here used, are 
uncorrelated with the unobservable shocks.  
[Insert table 2] 
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6 The result and discussion 
6.1 The PAYG system 
Two sequential probit models, following the argument indicated on section 3, were use to 
estimate the first method proposed above. 
The first probit model is constructed on the following way. It has a dummy variable 
measuring affiliation to any social security system on the left hand side and uses as explanatory 
variables the following set of variables: age, dummy variable for females, schooling, dummy 
variable for home ownership, dummy variable for self-employed worker, dummy variable for 
employee, dummy variable for domestic servant, dummy variable for family member on family 
business, dummy variable for permanent job, dummy variable for part-time job, dummy variable 
for temporary job, some geographic location variables that identify the household, a dummy 
variable for individuals on the army forces and a dummy variable for not married people. House 
ownership was included as a proxy variable for wealth, while the other set of variable included 
should be positively correlated with informal work. The second probit includes a dummy variable 
indicating affiliation to the PAYG social security system on the left hand side while the right 
hand side has as independent variables the age at the moment when the law was passed, dummy 
variable for females, dummy variable for widow, dummy variable for hard worker, schooling, 
dummy variable for affiliation to the army forces, dummy variable for affiliation on one of the 
main four institutions if the individual had stayed on the old system. Also the geographic location 
variables were included. The inclusion of those variables follows the discussion on section 3. The 
results for the two probit models have the signs we expected from the discussion of section 3. 
Table 3 shows those results. 
[Insert table 3] 
The last step involved running regressions for the three main variables: number of 
children, average child schooling and hours worked by parents. All regressions are for head of 
households aged 35 and older
14, as this is the set of individuals presenting the self-selection   21 
problem. On the case of the number of children, as dependent variable is used the natural log of 
the number of children while as independent variables are included the tax rate, the rate of return 
of the social security system, the control functions, location variables, a dummy variable for 
being married, dummy variable for females, age and age squared, the natural log of after-tax 
wage income and the natural log of years of schooling of the head of household. The inclusion of 
the additional variables to tax rate and rate of return follows from the possible heterogeneity 
among family￿s preferences. The results show that an increase of 1% on the social security tax 
produces a decrease of 4.4% on the number of children while an increase of 1% on the return of 
the social security tax produces an increase of 2.5% on the number of children. However, the 
second variable is not significant. Suppose there is an increase on the tax rate from its actual 
mean of 20% to a 30% on the PAYG system while holding the rate of return constant. In this 
case, the average number of children on the social security system should decrease from 1.21 to 
0.86. Other interesting results are that married people have 16% more children and females have 
25% less children than men. The specification was extended as a matter of sensitivity analysis. 
Initially it was additionally included a set of subsidies obtained by the household from the 
government and later health variables. The coefficient of tax rate and rate of return remains 
similar as it can be seen on table 4.1 and 4.2
15. 
[Insert table 4.1 and table 4.2] 
The case of schooling used as dependent variable the natural log of the average years of 
schooling of the children of the same household. The same basic specification, as in the case of 
children, was used but it was also added the natural log of the average age of children. The results 
indicate that an increase on the tax rate should increase the average year of schooling, but the 
coefficient is not significant at 40%. However, the effect of an increase on the tax of return has a 
negative and significant, 4% effect over schooling. As above different specifications were 
included but on all them the results were similar.   22 
The equation for hours worked is specified in two ways. First separated equations for 
female and male head of household are estimated. Second the dependent variable is specified as 
the average hours of work supplied by the marriage. Hours worked are measured on natural log 
and the specification includes the same variable as in the case of the number of children plus job 
characteristics. The results for male head of household labor supply show that an increase on the 
tax rate may decrease labor supply and an increase on the rate of return may increase labor 
supply. However, the estimated coefficients are clearly not significant. The elasticity of labor 
supply with respect to labor income is positive and highly significant. The age profile shows that 
men supply lower labor supply as they become older. A different picture appears when the case 
of women is analyzed. The results for women show that an increase in 1% on the tax rate 
decreases the hours supplied on 15% and the estimate is significant while the change on the rate 
of return has the opposite sign but it is clearly not significant. Consider the case of a woman 
providing 48 hours a week to the labor market (full time job). If the tax rate increases in 10% on 
the PAYG system from its mean, 20% to 30%, the labor supplied decreases to 11 hours per week 
(part-time job). The elasticity with respect of labor income is positive and significant as expected. 
The age profile on the labor supply is U-shaped, meaning that women provides larger labor 
supply when older. This result resembles the labor supply profile of any woman that brings up 
children in her reproductive lifecycle ￿typically 20 to 40 years old- and provides work later. 
When considered the average hours of work supplied by the marriage, the result show that an 
increase on the tax rate on 1% produce a 4.5% decrease on average hours supplied. The effect of 
the rate of return is again clearly not significant. Consider a marriage where wife and husband 
work a full time job, and they face an increase of 10% over the tax rate. In that case, the marriage 
decreases the average hours worked from 48 hours to 30 hours. Notice this last average is 
compatible with the husband working 48 hours (full time job) and the wife decreasing her labor 
supplied to 12 hours (part time job). Hence the specification for the marriage as a whole   23 
replicates the result obtained above for men and women separately.  The sensitivity analysis was 
carried out as above, but there was no significant change on the coefficients. 
 
6.2 Individual account estimates using the second procedure 
The estimations obtained using the instrumental variables seem quite interesting. As 
above it was used as a baseline specification a set of variables including demographic variables 
such as dummy variables for the head of household being married, female or widow plus her 
schooling level and age plus age squared. Later the introduction of subsidies and health variables 
are considered as a way of testing the sensitivity of estimations. In this case all the set of 
household observations are used (not just the one with head of households 35 years and older on 





*rben) are instrumented by fitted values 
obtained from running a regression between each of them and the four instruments stated above. 
As a remainder, notice that from equation (8), we have that the effect of an increase on 
tax rate over fertility rate on the individual account system is given by the coefficient of I1
*tax, 




*tax). Finally, the effect of the rate of return on the PAYG system is given only 
by the coefficient of the variable (I1
* I2
*rben). The results show that the number of children is not 
affected by changes on the level of the tax rate on the private system while it is negatively 
affected by increases on tax rate of the PAYG system. The coefficient corresponding to the effect 
of the PAYG tax rate over the number of children shows a negative effect near to 5.5%, however 
the results shows no effect of the individual account system tax rate over fertility. Notice that the 
effect of the tax rate over number of children on the PAYG system is almost the same as the one 
obtained on the first estimation method used. Schooling presents non-significant results for the 
PAYG or the private system tax changes.  
Also, the effect of the tax rate over labor supply reaffirms the findings obtained using the 
first estimation method. In fact, a 1% increase on the PAYG tax rate should have not effect over   24 
the male component of the marriage while it should decrease female labor supply on 10%. The 
effect on the private system has the same direction but the magnitude is stronger on the female 
case (16%), while male labor supply is not affected. The baseline results and the sensitivity 
analysis of them can be observed on table 5, 6.1 and 6.2. 
[Insert table 5, table 6.1 and table 6.2] 
Hence, we can conclude that the results, using both methods, seem to indicate that time 
the PAYG system may have a significant impact over fertility and labor supply decisions. In fact, 
larger tax rate decreases number of children as family may anticipate larger costs of bearing 
children. Also, time is an intensive input on childbearing production function and it is usually the 
mother￿s time endowment the more used on that production function. Hence mother￿s time is 
highly responsive to change on fiscal policy while father￿s time is not. It may be that the mother 
is more productive than the father on child education or that father￿s time has a larger opportunity 
cost at the labor market than her wife￿s time. Both cases are plausible and it will not be analyzed 
the empirical relative relevance of them as this question is not part of this study.  
 
6.3 Effects over the sustainability of the PAYG system 
The results show two clear effects of an increase on the level of taxes on the PAYG 
system, namely fertility rates and female labor supply are negatively influenced. But, those 
effects on the family decision choice have also an effect on the fiscal budget. In fact, the smaller 
are the fertility rate and the female labor supply, the smaller is the income base the government 
faces to obtain revenues and the larger should be the tax rate individuals must face, given the 
level of expenditure. The PAYG system has an endogenous problem of sustainability in that 
scenario. An initial increase on tax rate requires larger future tax rate as the income base becomes 
smaller in the near future. Furthermore, larger tax rates on the future produce smaller fertility 
rates and smaller female labor supply. This is a vicious circle that generates the elimination of the   25 
PAYG system on a finite horizon of time. To describe the impact of this circle over the tax rate 
path, a simulation of a very stylized economy will be illustrated next. 
Let￿s consider the problem of the reaction of fertility to changes on the PAYG system. 
The labor supply responses will be neglected for simplicity. Suppose a very stylized economy 
with a zero growth rate where the government taxes labor income at rate τ and promises to the 
generation currently working a social security return Φ over their contributions and a level of 
benefits independents of past contributions, Γ, when retired. Those promises are not broken and 
the government maintains an equilibrated budget at each moment of time. Hence it must adjust 
the payroll tax rates at each moment of time, τt, to keep balance between current revenues and 
current expenditures on social security, given the parametersΦ and Γ, if the level of revenues or 
expenditures are not constants over time. 
As labor supply is neglected from the problem, individuals supply inelastically their time 
to the labor market and they receive labor income at time t, wt. Labor income is constant over 
time, as the economy does not growth. 
Let Exp t+1 be current government expenditure on period t+1 per retired individual. The 
government spends at period t+1, (1+Φ) of the revenues obtained at period t, namely the payroll 
taxes at period t, plus the lump sum benefits. The component of retirement benefits that is 
independent of past contributions, Γ t+1, will be a constant fraction ∆ of total income at t+1, wt+1nt. 
This last feature indicates that the government spends a constant fraction of GDP on lump sum 
benefits. Hence its expenditures at t+1 are: 
t t t t t t t t n w w w Exp 1 1 1 ) 1 ( ) 1 ( + + + ∆ + Φ + = Γ + Φ + = τ τ  
On the revenue side, the revenues at t+1 depend on taxes at t+1 and the current labor 
income at t+1. As the number of individuals working compared to those retired has been 
increased by the fertility rate nt, the revenues at t+1 are: 
   1 1 1 Re + + + = t t t t w n v τ    26 
  Then equating revenues and expenditures, we have: 
∆ +
Φ +
= ⇒ = + + + t
t
t t t n
Exp v τ τ
1
Re 1 1 1      ( 9 )  
This last expression describes the evolution of taxes over time. Whenever  Φ + 1  is 
smaller than fertility rate, the long run level of taxes converge to  )) 1 ( /( Φ + − ∆ = n n τ  while 
when  Φ + 1  is larger than fertility rate, the tax rate explodes for any initial level of lump sum 
benefits. In fact, on the former case the system is sustainable as the aggregate growth rate of the 
economy, determined by population growth rate, is larger than the rental rate of return of the 
social security system. On the later case, the opposite holds and the system is unsustainable by 
definition.  
Consider now, the case where  Φ + 1  is smaller than the fertility rate ￿the sustainable 
case, in absence of the effect of tax over fertility rate. Table 7 presents simulations of the 
evolution of tax rate for subsequent generations for different values of the parameters when the 
effect of an increase of 1% of the social security tax over fertility rate is a negative impact 5%, as 
we found on our empirical results. The case illustrates the evolution of taxes for initial values of 
the parameters where  n / ) 1 ( Φ +  ranges between 0.7 and 0.8 and ∆ between 1.5% and 3%. The 
initial level of taxes is set at the level  )) 1 ( /( Φ + − ∆ = n n τ , where n indicates the long run level 
of fertility in absence of PAYG social security system. The value of n is set equal to 2. The case 
of ∆ and  n / ) 1 ( Φ +  equal to 1.5% and 80% respectively, shows that the tax rate becomes 12% 
and the number of children is 1.1 after three generations while the initial long run tax level is only 
8%. The same case, but ∆ being 3%, shows a larger impact with tax rate becoming 37% after 
three generations, while the number of children decrease to 0.3. 
[Insert table 7] 
The cases where  n / ) 1 ( Φ +  is smaller than 0.8, similar but smaller effects are obtained. 
Hence the system may become unsustainable in as a short period of 3 generations. This evolution   27 
of taxes seems to follow the evolution of social security taxes in Chile. The SSA taxed their 
contributors (employee plus employer tax) only on 5% on 1925. However, the tax rate increase 
steadily until reaching 56.9% on 1974 and decrease from its 1974 value to 34.3% on 1980. The 
fertility rate followed the opposite behavior over the period. On 1981 the system was reformed 
due to a sustainability
16 problem.   
In summary, the PAYG system may have an endogenous sustainability problem as it 
affects fertility rates and lowers the income base where revenues can be obtained. The impact is 




  This study tests the prediction of the literature linking social security system and family 
decision choices using a micro-database obtained from Chile. Two different methods of 
estimations are used. In one hand, self-selection control functions are used, while on the other 
hand, instrumental variables methodology is followed. The set of instrumental variables follows 
from the characteristics of the law that reformed the social security system on 1981. In fact, the 
law allows to some individuals to self-select between systems, while other individuals were 
required exogenously to affiliate either to the PAYG system or the individual account system.  
Both estimations show similar results for fertility and labor supply decisions. The PAYG 
system should have a negative impact over fertility rate, and in fact, a 1% increase on social 
security tax should decrease the number of children on nearly 5%. The results also sustain the 
importance of time on childbearing. Mothers￿ time is highly responsive to change on the fiscal 
policy while fathers￿ time is not.  Larger social security taxes may explain the difference between 
part time and full time jobs on the case of females. 
Those results indicate an endogenous problem of sustainability for ￿pay-as-you-go￿ 
social security system as they decrease fertility rate and hours worked by females producing a   28 
decrease on revenues over time. Simulations show large effects over tax rate -after two to three 
generations of the implementation- on the PAYG system.  
Contrarily to the PAYG effects the individual account system shows no effect over 
fertility rate or the quality of children, measured using schooling level. This result may indicates 
that in absence of borrowing constraints, the individual account social security system should not 
produce any effect over the intertemporal budget constraint or marginal cost of children, as it may 
on the PAYG system. 
Finally, on the paper it was assumed that time spent on each child may have a positive 
effect on education, however time spent on children may also, and maybe more importantly, 
affect others aspects of child￿s life such as family formation, abortion, crime, etc... Hence the 
analysis may also be extended to those areas where further impacts may be found. 
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Chile 1900-1995 


































































































































































e  31 
Data Appendix 
The dataset is the 1998 CASEN survey from Chile. It is available from the Chilean government. 






 Observations  Mean  Standard 
Dev. 
Min Max 
Tax rate  144522  5.74  6.63  0  22.5 
Rate of return of PAYG  67895  -57.4  26.8  -99  45.3 
Rate of return of PAYG if 
Female, widow and less than 6 years of 
schooling 
431 -78.6  33.6  -91  45.1 
Rate of return of PAYG if 
more than 12 years of schooling 
10173 -58.9 18.3 -99  -29 
Hours worked by head of household 
If age >35 
24642 52.44  63.89  0  99 
Hours worked by head of household 
If age >35 and PAYG affiliation 
5058 54.57  87.48 0  80 
Hours worked by head of household 
If age >35 and no PAYG affiliation 
21047 52.14  60.35  0  80 
Number of children per head of household if 
age >35 
37257 1.65 1.41  0  11 
Number of children per head of household if 
age >35 and PAYG affiliation 
15230 1.21 1.27  0  10 
Number of children per head of household if 
age >35 and no PAYG affiliation 
25627 1.94 1.31  0  10 
Average child schooling on household where 
head is 35 years and older 
27775 9.41 3.39  0  19 
Average child schooling on household where 
head is 35 years and older and PAYG 
Affiliation 
9623 10.28  3.26  0  19 
Average child schooling on household where 
head is 35 years and older and no PAYG 
Affiliation 
21860 9.40 3.52  0  19 
Age of head of household 
If age >35 
37257 54.69  13.28 36  99 
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Table 2 
Social Security systems and Instrumental variable estimators by characteristics 
 




































                        
N.  Children 1.18 1.82  -43.6  1.75 1.61  8.63 1.64  1.91 -3.91  1.55 1.66  -7.66  0.67 1.66  -23.7 
Size  3.57  4.06 -23.4 4.01  3.88 6.11  3.91  4.06  -1.6* 3.62  3.98 -17.4 2.88  3.93 -18.2 
Married  0.62  0.84 -46.4 0.80  0.71 18.5  0.96  0.73  -10.3 0.84  0.70 27.4 0.36  0.74 -27.7 
Widow  0.23 0.02  65.5  0.05 0.12  -19.9  0.002  0.11 6.99  0.004  0.14  -38.5  0.55 0.10  47.0 
Female  0.26 0.11  36.1  0.11 0.23  -27.5 0.01  0.21 9.83  0.12 0.23  -24.4  0.44 0.20  18.7 
                        
Location  0.26  0.31 -9.94 0.23  0.29 -11.6  0.22  0.27  2.44* 0.29  0.27 2.7* 0.22  0.28 -4.34 
                        
Education  7.61  10.4 -64.4 8.79  9.25 -9.94 12.45  9.14  -16.0  10.94  8.71 49.12 5.66  9.24 -28.5 
                        
 Hours worked   47.7  49.8  -8.00  53.15  52.33  1.10*  55.3  48.7  -7.78  52.9  52.4  0.66*  57.4  52.5  0.64* 
                        
Labor  income  197886 285545 -8.24 281289 249121  4.02  296672  256962  -1.1* 213119 271517 -7.16  78900 258462 -3.97 
                        
Subsidy  1  1281  2480 -29.9  584  1923 -37.5  2716  1646  -6.65 1989  1571 11.59 376  1684 -13.3 
Subsidy  2  454  678  -8.47  1357 752 19.6  7.7  881  6.34  1199 792  13.18  342  886  -6.46 
Subsidy  3  295  231 4.91 232  254 -1.6*  32  252  3.84 130  280 -11.7  270  249  0.59* 
Subsidy  4  3516 820  31.45  2710  2795  -0.7* 152  2799 5.17 570 3333  -24.2  9250  2631  21.2 
                        
Sick  0.33 0.18  29.6  0.21 0.24  -5.16 0.16  0.23 3.64  0.16 0.30  -23.5  0.47 0.18  22.6 
Hospital  0.36 0.21  30.7  0.25 0.28  -6.2 0.12  0.28  6.8 0.22 0.35  -21.2  0.38 0.21  13.4 
                        
Note: * indicates not significant at 1%. Location is a dummy variable equal to one if the individual lives on Santiago (The main city in Chile). 
Subsidy 1 is a subsidy mainly related to minimum pensions for elderly. Subsidy 2 is governmental subsidy per child attending school. Subsidy 3 is 
an unemployment subsidy. Subsidy 4 is a subsidy for low-income families to pay water supply services. Sick and hospital are dummy variables 




















1(Not married)  0.1105 
(4.912) 
- 




1(House owner)  -0.0214 
(-1.161) 
- 






1(domestic worker)  0.6623 
(10.251) 
- 
1(Non paid family related working 




1(Army forces)  1.6973 
(6.198) 
- 
1(Permanent work)  0.1993 
(4.189) 
- 
1(temporal work)  -0.3623 
(-6.489) 
- 
1(part time work)  -0.1803 
(-2.455) 
- 
Age on 1981  -  0.0637 
(52.203) 
1(Hard worker)  -  0.2281 
(5.625) 
1(SSA) -  -0.8823 
(-22.012) 
1(PRWPA) -  -0.7728 
(-22.191) 







2 0.2465  0.4177 
Prob >chi2  0.0000  0.0000 
Number of Observations  69225  40504 
 
Note:1(•) is an indicator function, one if true and zero otherwise. The estimation is among individuals 35 
years and older. T-ratios are in parenthesis. The second probit includes individuals that chose to affiliate 
only. The location variables are omitted from the table.   34 
Table 4 
The Baseline regression using control functions 
 
  Log of number 
of children 
Log of average 
years of 
schooling 
Log of hours 
worked, 
female 
Log of hours 
worked, male 
Log of hours 
worked, 
marriage 






























































































         
R
2 0.1796 0.5141  0.2388  0.1492  0.1489 
Prob F  0.0000  0.0000  0.0000  0.0000  0.0000 
         
Number of 
observations 
2948 2877  465  2975  3443 
 
The estimations are among head of households affiliated to the PAYG social security system 
currently being aged 35 years and older. T-ratios are in parenthesis and are calculate using robust 
standard errors. The estimations also include location and age variables. Last three columns also 
include job characteristics. Also * indicates significant at least at 5%. 
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Sensitivity analysis 
Table 5.1 Subsidies included 
 
  Log of number 
of children 
Log of average 
years of 
schooling 
Log of hours 
worked, 
female 
Log of hours 
worked, male 
Log of hours 
worked, 
marriage 
















































Constant Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes 
Subsidies Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes 
Health vars.  No  No  No  No  No 
         
R
2 0.2319 0.533  0.348  0.1615  0.1769 
Prob F  0.0000  0.0000  0.0000  0.0000  0.0000 
Number of 
observations 
2948 2877  465  2975  3443 
Table 5.1 has the same specification as table 3, plus subsidies. The estimations are among head of 
households affiliated to the PAYG social security system currently being aged 35 years and older. 
T-ratios are in parenthesis and are calculate using robust standard errors. The estimations also 
include location variables and dummy variables for married and widow individuals, age, age 
squared and log of labor income. Last three columns also include job characteristics. Also * 
indicates significant at least at 5%. 
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Table 5.2 Subsidies and health variable included 
 
  Log of number 
of children 
Log of average 
years of 
schooling 
Log of hours 
worked, 
female 
Log of hours 
worked, male 
Log of hours 
worked, 
marriage 
















































Constant Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes 
Subsidies Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes 
Health vars.  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes 
         
R
2 0.2356 0.5377  0.3507  0.1677  0.1783 
Prob F  0.0000  0.0000  0.0000  0.0000  0.0000 
Number of 
observations 
2948 2877  465  2975  3443 
Table 5.2 has the same specification as table 3, plus subsidies and health variables. The 
estimations are among head of households affiliated to the PAYG social security system currently 
being aged 35 years and older. T-ratios are in parenthesis and are calculate using robust standard 
errors. The estimations also include location variables and dummy variables for married and 
widow individuals, age, age squared and log of labor income. Last three columns also include job 
characteristics. Also * indicates significant at least at 5%.   37 
Table 6 




  Log of number 
of children 
Log of average 
years of 
schooling 
Log of hours 
worked, 
female 
Log of hours 
worked, male 







































































Yes Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes 
Subsidies No  No  No  No  No 
Health vars.  No  No  No  No  No 











        
R
2 0.1068  0.7462  0.1275  0.0479  0.046 
Prob F  0.0000  0.0000  0.0000  0.0000  0.0000 
        
Number of 
observations 
21960 18522  2637  22152  24844 
 





instrumented using the four dummy variable described in section 5.2.  T-ratios are in parenthesis 
and are calculate using robust standard errors. The estimations also include location variables and 
dummy variables for married and widow individuals, age, age squared and log of labor income. 
Last three columns also include job characteristics. Also * indicates significant at least at 5%. 
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Table 6.1 
Instrumental variable approach: Including subsidies 
  
 
  Log of number 
of children 
Log of average 
years of 
schooling 
Log of hours 
worked, 
female 
Log of hours 
worked, male 







































Yes Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes 
Subsidies Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes 
Health vars.  No  No  No  No  No 
        
R
2 0.1927  0.7500  0.1352  0.050  0.0484 
Prob F  0.0000  0.0000  0.0000  0.0000  0.0000 
Number of 
observations 
21960 18522  2637  22152  24844 
 





instrumented using the four dummy variable described in section 5.2.  T-ratios are in parenthesis 
and are calculate using robust standard errors. The estimations also include location variables and 
dummy variables for married and widow individuals, age, age squared and log of labor income. 
Last three columns also include job characteristics. Also * indicates significant at least at 5%. 
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Table 6.2 
Instrumental variable approach: Including subsidies and health variables 
  
 
  Log of number 
of children 
Log of average 
years of 
schooling 
Log of hours 
worked, 
female 
Log of hours 
worked, male 







































Yes Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes 
Subsidies Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes 
Health vars.  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes 
        
R
2 0.194  0.7501  0.1366  0.0515  0.0501 
Prob F  0.0000  0.0000  0.0000  0.0000  0.0000 
Number of 
observations 
21960 18522  2637  22152  24844 
 





instrumented using the four dummy variable described in section 5.2.  T-ratios are in parenthesis 
and are calculate using robust standard errors. The estimations also include location variables and 
dummy variables for married and widow individuals, age, age squared and log of labor income. 
Last three columns also include job characteristics. 
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Table 7 
Simulations: Evolution of the tax rate 
 
Case:   ∆=1.5%     ∆=3%   











n / ) 1 ( Φ + , 
% 
Generation 1  2.00  5  70  2.00  10  70 
Generation 2  1.50  5  88  1.00  10  105 
Generation 3  1.50  6  88  1.00  14  105 
Generation 4  1.43  7  91  0.83  17  123 
         
         
Generation 1  2.00  6  75  2.00  12  75 
Generation 2  1.40  6  98  0.80  12  120 
Generation 3  1.40  7  98  0.80  17  120 
Generation 4  1.31  9  104  0.58  24  152 
         
         
Generation 1  2.00  8  80  2.00  15  80 
Generation 2  1.25  8  110  0.50  15  140 
Generation  3  1.25 10  110  0.50 24  140 
Generation  4  1.11 12  122  0.28 37  203 
         
 
 
                                                            
1 University of Chicago and Pontificia Universidad Catolica de Chile. E-mail: r-cerda@uchicago.edu 
2 Chile faced two consecutives external crisis on 1975 and 1982. 
3 The law was passed and implemented during 1981. 
4 There also existed a pension administration for the police department. 
5 ￿Reforma a los Sistemas de Pensiones￿, Asociacion Internacional de Organismos Supervisores de Fondos 
de Pensiones, 1996, page 77. 
6 See Arellano (1984). 
7 This survey describes the socioeconomic characteristics of the Chilean population. 
8 33714 urban and 14393 rural households 
9 As social security taxes are paid as a fraction of labor income the information of social security affiliation 
is directly linked to employment. 
10 Individual account system 
11 Females retire at 60 years old while males at 65 years old by law. 
12 The procedure is also developed in Maddala (1993), page 278. 
13 See Maddala (1993). 
14 Individuals that could self-select themselves. 
15 The tax rate becomes more significant as more variables are added, but with the same sign. 
16 The PRWPA charged a tax rate of 64.7% of the labor wage on 1974. 